Precautionary Saving over the Life Cycle John Laitner
Two principal models that economists use to describe private saving behavior are the life-cycle, or "overlapping generations," model and the dynastic model. In each, an agent's current flow of utility depends upon his flow of consumption (and leisure) and the flow utility function is concave. The concavity makes the agent desire a smooth, as opposed to choppy, time path of consumption. The original life-cycle model stressed the natural unevenness of lifetime earnings -rising in youth and middle age, and disappearing at retirement. In that context, households should save in earning years and dissave in retirement to attain an even lifetime profile of consumption. Alternative life-cycle formulations incorporate year-to-year fluctuations in earnings due to erratic promotions, business cycles, etc. Households might want to save extra relatively early in life to accumulate a stock of wealth, which we might call a "precautionary" stock, as a reserve to buffer such high frequency fluctuations. In the second basic model, the dynastic model, a household with exceptionally high earnings may accumulate wealth to build an estate, through which it can share its good luck with its descendants. We can think of buffer-stock behavior as saving predicated on a very short time horizon, traditional life-cycle wealth accumulation (and decumulation) as behavior predicated on the time horizon of one life span, and estate building as behavior based upon an intergenerational time horizon. Laitner [2001 Laitner [ , 2002 Laitner [ , 2003 ] argues that the latter may be especially important in explaining the substantial empirical wealth disparities among U.S. households; Barro [1974] shows that dynastic behavior may enormously influence policy implications. 1 The purpose of the present paper is to formulate, and to calibrate, a life-cycle model with both saving for retirement and precautionary saving -with the ultimate goal of developing a well-specified component for a compound model with both life-cycle and dynastic behavior.
There are at least two types of lifetime uncertainty of potential interest. One includes aggregative shocks from, for example, business cycle fluctuations. Aiyagari [1994] argues that these may not have a quantitatively large effect on household saving -though results tend to be very sensitive to the way one models the stochastic process of the shocks.
2 A second arises from the heterogeneity of earnings among individual households. The latter is the focus of the present paper. There is a distribution of starting wages and salaries, and we assume that each household quickly realizes its initial position; nevertheless, the distribution tends to fan out with age and relative positions change. We assume that a young household is unsure about its eventual luck, and the effect on saving of uncertainty about the evolution of one's earnings later in life is this paper's topic. This paper finds, strictly speaking, a relatively small role for precautionary saving. In contrast, it finds that differences in lifetime earning profiles across individuals can affect aggregative saving to a quantitatively important degree regardless of whether the differences are predictable or not. In other words, in this paper uncertainty per se turns out not to be as important as heterogeneity of lifetime earning profile shapes. Analyses that overlook uncertainty tend to assume uniformity of earning profiles, and we find that it is the latter assumption that may generate misleading results.
Lifetime Earnings
We begin by examining lifetime earnings profiles for men from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
Data. Table 1 presents information on the subsamples that we employ. We use male earnings histories from . We separate the sample into four education categories: less than high school, high school, some college, and college or more. We do not use the so-called poverty sample in the PSID. We use only ages less than or equal to 60 and greater than or equal to the larger of years of education plus 6 and 16. Table 1 shows that our panel is unbalanced: for a minority of men, we have 28 consecutive earnings figures; for most, we have far fewer. The total number of observations in every education category is, however, over 8,000. Although in 1983 PSID earnings were top coded at $99,999, the data shows this is a relatively minor issue. Some men work part time. When hours were less than 1750 hours per year, we compute the wage rate and adjust earnings upward to 1750 hours. (Figures above 1750 hours/year receive no correction.) For men who desired part time work, this adjustment seems appropriate to make their earnings reflect their potential. Similarly for the case of insured health leaves. In the case of involuntary and uninsured unemployment, on the other hand, the adjustment causes us to understate earnings uncertainty, making our results below conservative. Table 1 shows that the adjustment of hours affects more than 1 in 7 earnings figures. With the same reasoning, we drop observations with 0 hours. Table 1 records drops preceded and followed by positive hours (e.g., a zero in 1984 for a man who had positive hours in 1983 and 1985 is recorded). About one tenth of the potential observations were zero.
Ordinary Least Squares. Economists have long used so-called "earnings dynamics" models to characterize the life course of an individual's earnings (e.g., Lillard and Weiss [1979] and Abowd and Card [1989] ). Such a model usually has the following form: we regress the logarithm of an individual's earnings at each age on a (low order) polynomial of age and a system of yearly dummy variables. The polynomial should show earnings rising with age until the mid forties to mid fifties, and then beginning a slow decline; the time dummies should show the influence of technological progress, with earnings generally rising over time, and business cycle peaks and troughs, with earnings growth flat or even negative in the troughs. The idea of the age-dependent part of the earnings dynamics model is that on-the-job training and experiential human capital accumulation should increase a worker's earning ability through middle age, but subsequently depreciation of skills may well predominate. Table A1 in the Appendix to this paper presents OLS regression results for the simple (but standard) model
where y it is the earnings of male i at time t, z it is the male's age at time t, D j (t) is a dummy variable which is 1 if t = j and 0 otherwise, and it is a regression error (capturing measurement error in ln(y it ) and omitted explanatory variables orthogonal to the included regressors). We omit a dummy for 1984, so that remaining betas measure the effect of time relative to 1984. The estimates in Table A1 conform with our anticipations. Omitting the influence of technological progress, earnings peak in the age range 45-49. 3 If we compare peak earnings with earnings at say age 25, the ratio is about 1.5 for the lowest education group and about 2.2 for the highest. Looking at the table for all education groups together, the time dummies show strong annual growth from technological change from 1967-1978; after that there is very little growth, and business cycle dips induce declines in the early 1980s and early 1990s. The slow growth in the second half of the period is consistent with the general slowdown in the rate of technological progress after the early 1970s, which economists have frequently noted. Table 2 is particularly important for this paper's model: for individual ages, Table 2 presents weighted-average estimates of the variance of the residual from equation (1) . The table omits the youngest workers -for whom labor market participation is especially erratic. Each column except the first then reveals a clear pattern: the variance of the regression error rises with age. The increase for the first column is miniscule. For column 2, however, between ages 25-39 and 46-60 the increase is 25%; for column 3, it is 62%; for college graduates, it is 65%; and for the sample as a whole, it is 44%. Maximum Likelihood. As explained in the introduction, we assume that workers understand their initial earning differences but that young workers are unsure about how they will fair relative to their peers as the differences reshuffle and grow with age. The purpose of this paper is to study the consequences for saving behavior of the resulting uncertainty for individual households. The key to our analysis is the variance pattern in Table 2 . To proceed, we examine the error term of equation (1) in detail.
A common approach in the earnings dynamics literature is to specify the regression error as the sum of two components:
with µ an individual-specific characteristic, and η an independent, idiosyncratic error. This assumes that individuals have differences in life-long earning ability, which the lifelong component of their regression error, µ i , captures. Typically, one would assume that µ and η are independently normally distributed. This is the "random effects" model of . The random effects model by itself, however, will not explain the pattern of rising variances in Table 2 . Although one might guess that cross-sectional differences in earnings vary from year to year, that presumably does not lead to the variance pattern of Table 2 . Earnings will tend to be high in general in years of business-cycle prosperity, and low in troughs, but our time dummies should capture such phenomena. Although conceivably cross-sectional variation is higher in some years than others, the PSID attempts to represent the entire population at each date: as the original respondents (from 1968) aged and died, the PSID replaced them with young households. Thus, the fraction of, say, 50 year olds in the sample should match the U.S. population as a whole in every year. Sample weights should correct for minor problems of representativeness, and all of our regressions use weights. Since the sample then represents all ages in every year, year to year cycles should not affect the pattern of variances by age in Table 2 .
One possible hypothesis, say, H 0 , that could explain the pattern in Table 2 is that older workers endure larger idiosyncratic shocks. In other words, perhaps the variance of η it in (2) rises with age. For example, upward steps in earnings typically follow promotions, and for young workers promotions may be frequent and small, but for older workers promotions may be infrequent and sizable. Letting z it be the age of worker i at time t, a simple specification would then be
where age 45 is the middle of a working life, µ i and η it and η * it are independent normal random variables with zero mean, and the variance of η * is larger than the variance of η. A second hypothesis, say, H 00 , is that µ i changes over a worker's life span. One story could be as follows. In youth, a worker does "technical" tasks -assembly line jobs, assigned research work, etc. In the second half of a career, a worker may rise to a managerial position in which he is directing younger workers. If a worker does assume managerial responsibilities, his earnings trajectory takes an upward step; if not, his earnings may be level or even erode as his technical skills become obsolete. Another story could be that some workers experience health problems in old age, and their earnings suffer, while others do not. A third possibility is that in youth, a worker trains for a career involving a particular technology or product; over time, the technology or product may grow in importance and the worker may prosper, or a new technology or product may arrive and make the worker's training obsolete. A simple formulation is
where µ and µ * and η are normal random variables with zero means; η is independent of the other two; and µ and µ * are distributed bivariate normal with the marginal distribution of the latter having a higher variance. We might expect the correlation coefficient for µ and µ * to be positive but less than one.
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The procedure that we employ nests (3)-(4): we assume a components of error formulation
where µ and µ * and η and η * are normal random variables with zero means; η and η * are each independent of the other three, and have variance σ η and σ η * , respectively; and µ and µ * are distributed bivariate normal with marginal variances σ µ and σ µ * and correlation ρ ∈ (−1, 1) .
Consider a household with index i. Let the vector θ include α and β from (1) and the variances and correlation from (5) . Letting x it be the vector of covariates for household i at time t, use the notation
Let times before the household is age 45 be indexed with s; let the times after age 45 be indexed with t. Let the normal density function for a variable z with mean 0 and standard deviation σ be φ(z | σ). Then the likelihood function for the household if none of its observations are top coded is
The likelihood function for top coded households is only slightly different. Top coding can only occur in 1983. Suppose household i is top coded at ages < 45. Then the likelihood function for the household's observations is
Similarly if the top coding occurs after age 45. If I is the set of non-top coded households andĪ the set of top coded households, then maximum likelihood estimation determines θ from
( Table 1 shows the number of top coded households is small.) Table 2A in the Appendix exhibits maximum likelihood estimates of α and β. Rather than force the changes to take place instantly, we exclude observations for ages 3 years before and after age 45. The results resemble those from OLS in Table A1 . This is not surprising: other than top coded observations, OLS should provide consistent estimates. Table 3 presents our estimates of the precisions h η = 1/σ η , h η * = 1/σ η * , h µ = 1/σ µ , and h µ * = 1/σ µ * and of the correlation coefficient ρ. Under H 0 , since σ η < σ η * , we would have
under H 00 , since σ µ < σ µ * , we would have Table 3 strongly favors H 00 . In every column, h µ > h µ * : in columns 1-5, respectively, h µ * is 82% as large as h µ , 76%, 77%, 48%, and 68% as large. In most cases h η and h η * are almost the same. The one anomaly is column 1, where h η * is 18% larger than h η -and even then the inequality is in the opposite direction from what H 0 predicts.
The next section assumes H 00 and turns to a model of household saving.
Life Cycle Saving
This section lays out a traditional life cycle model emphasizing saving for retirement. Then it adds the precautionary saving that is this paper's focus. Saving for Retirement. We begin with a traditional life-cycle model emphasizing saving in youth and middle age and dissaving in old age (e.g., Modigliani [1986] ).
Let the number of "equivalent adults" per household be n s . Let a household's head constitute 1 "equivalent adult." For a married household, let the spouse constitute ξ S additional equivalent adults. Although ξ S might be 1, it could also be substantially less if there are scale economies to household size. If at age s the household head has a spouse, set n 
We follow Tobin [1967] , who suggests a utility-flow model
The idea is that a single-member household with consumption c 1 and the same household at a different age with n equivalent adults and consumption c n achieve the same per capita current utility flow when c n = n · c 1 , and that a household weights u(.) with n because the household values the per capita utility flows of all members equally. This paper's life-cycle maximization model is then as follows: for household i, born at t, and retiring at age R, we solve for consumption c its at each age s
subject to:
where δ is the subjective discount rate; equivalent adults, n is , come from (10); and, a its is the household's net worth (e.g., net asset) position at age s. We assume that financial institutions do not allow borrowing without collateral; hence, the household's net worth can never be negative. As is common in the literature, we assume u(.) is isoelastic:
The maximal life span is T years. The household supplies ψ is "effective hours" in the labor market per hour of work time; thus, if w · e g·(t+s) , where g > 0 is the rate of labor augmenting technological progress, is the economy wide average wage rate, the household's pretax earnings are ψ is · w · e g·(t+s) per hour at age s. We assume a proportional income tax with rate τ . Life spans are uncertain. Let q s be the probability of surviving through age s. To simplify, we average male and female survival rates and assume a husband and wife die together. Aftertax earnings at age s are
We assume that markets offer actuarially fair annuities and that all households take advantage of them. The underlying interest rate is r. At age s, an annuity pays
This exceeds r since q s is a declining function of s. The aftertax rate of return on savings is
Economists have long realized that Social Security benefits reduce households' needs for life-cycle wealth. The term SS its in the budget constraint of (11) reflects Social Security taxes in youth and benefits in old age. The Social Security tax is proportional up to a cap; benefits vary with lifetime earnings and a progressive structure of brackets. This paper assumes that over time the cap and the benefit brackets move proportionately to the level e g·t of technology, which preserves the homothetic structure of (11).
Precautionary Saving. This subsection modifies the framework above to incorporate uncertainty about lifetime earnings. Although in our framework markets provide securities (i.e., annuities) that protect a household against mortality risk, we assume that problems stemming from moral hazard preclude market insurance against earnings uncertainty. Households respond with self-insurance efforts. We call the additional wealth that selfinsurance stimulates "precautionary saving."
The earnings dynamics analysis of Section 1 provides the template. Each household's age-trajectory of "effective hours" is a quadratic function of age:
with α i as estimated -see Table A2 in the Appendix. Each household is born with a different earning ability -which Section 1's individual effect µ captures. We assume that a household discovers its µ as it begins work. Nevertheless, in midlife the household's individual effect changes to µ * , and we assume that though the household knows the distribution from which µ * will emerge, it only learns its actual realization from the distribution at age 45. Section 1 posits a bivariate normal distribution for (µ, µ * ) pairs in the population as a whole, with zero means and parameters σ µ , σ µ * , and ρ. For consistency with the regression model, we assume that condition on its beginning individual effect µ, a young household perceives that it faces a normal distribution for µ * with
If Q(.) is as in (14) and household i is age s, and if M is midlife (M = 45 in this paper), we then have
where R is the age of retirement. This paper treats R as exogenously given. 7 From this point forward, we ignore the error components η and η * from our likelihood function: think of them as characterizing measurement error. Section 1 provides a possible story for the change from µ i to µ * i in midlife. 6 The first argument in N (., .) below is the mean, and the second is the variance. Note that the mean in this case is the mean conditional on individual effect µ in the first period of life; the unconditional mean, as stated, is zero by assumption. 7 In contrast, see, for example, Laitner [2003] .
Aggregate Household Life-Cycle Net Worth. Let A t be aggregate household life-cycle net worth at time t if households face lifetime earning uncertainty, and let A c t be the same in the certainty case.
Although our focus is precautionary saving, we develop a control, or comparison case as follows. Suppose household i, born at t, learns its µ i and its µ * i at its inception. Such households have no lifetime uncertainty; hence, they have no need for precautionary wealth accumulation. In this case, given (16), we can solve (11) . 8 Call the resulting net worth at age s for a household born at time s and having earning abilities µ and µ * a c (µ, µ * , t, s) .
Let Section 1's bivariate normal density for (µ, µ * ) be
recalling that the population means for µ and for µ * are zero. Then average household assets at time t are
Similarly, average gross-of-tax earnings are
Call the integral in (18) E. If we multiply (17) by the population of the economy, we have A c t ; if we multiply (18) by the population, we have the economy's gross-of-tax wage bill. A ratio of the two is independent of the population's absolute size. Furthermore, an important consequence of homothetic preferences is that technological change and the wage w each affect (17) and (18) strictly proportionately. Thus,
with the ratio independent of t, w, and the population. If there is lifetime earning uncertainty, the analysis is slightly more complicated. As before, let M be the age at midlife. Let J(a M , µ, µ * , t) be second-period-of-life utility for a household born at t, entering its second period with net worth a M , having secondperiod-of-life earning ability µ * , and having first-period ability µ. Then
(Notice that J(.) depends on µ because a household's Social Security benefits depend on its lifetime earnings -though ψ(µ, µ * , s) for s ≥ M does not dependent on µ.) Similarly, let I(a M , µ, t) be first-period-of-life utility if the household has earning ability µ and ends its first period with net worth a M . Since Social Security taxes depend only on current earnings, we can write SS(µ, .) ts for s ≤ M . Then
For a given µ and t, we can solve for a M from
where the density for µ * conditional on µ comes from (15) . For the model with uncertainty, our procedure is as follows: determine a M from (22); then determine assets a(µ, µ * , t − s, s) from (20)- (21); and, then substitute the latter into (17) in place of a c (.). Line (18) remains as before. As in (19) , our isoelastic preferences enable us to derive
with E as above, and with the last ratio independent of time, w, and the economy's population.
Simulations
We want to compare (19) and (23) to find the quantitative importance of precautionary saving. Laitner [2001] suggests the empirical ratio for 1995 of private net worth to grossof-tax labor earnings for the U.S. was about 4.61.
10 Because this paper's model omits estate building, we do not necessarily expect our simulations to produce ratios as high as the empirical one.
Calibration. Although early life-cycle analyses calibrated their parameters in part on the basis of author introspection (e.g., Tobin [1967] ), this paper relies heavily on recent estimates from empirical studies.
The child, spouse, and retirement adult-equivalency weights in (10) are potentially important determinants of life-cycle saving -high relative weights for children, for example, front load household consumption and can drastically reduce total life-cycle wealth accumulation (e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987, ch.11] ] find a consumption reduction of 10-20% or more upon retirement. For our base case, we set ξ R = .85. Typical values of the household subjective discount rate δ are .00-.02, reflecting households' impatience to consumer sooner rather than later. Laitner [2003] finds that a household's consumption per capita seems to grow on average about 2%/year with age. With this rate of growth, a household's consumption is roughly 2.2 times as high at age 65 as at age 25. Our simulations assume such a growth rate, and derive the δ in each case consistent with it.
The isoelastic parameter γ determines households' degree of risk aversion: if γ is near 1, utility is almost linear and households are quite comfortable with substantial year-toyear consumption unevenness; if γ is small, very negative in particular, utility is sharply concave and households are very averse to consumption fluctuations, hence they are very risk averse. Estimates in the literature range from γ = 0 to -4. We use a standard mortality table for 1995, averaging mortality rates for men and women. The average life expectancy is 77 years. For simplicity, we assume that a husband and wife die together. For earnings, we use our estimates for the whole PSID sample of α i from Table A2 in the Appendix. Our base-case estimates of h µ , h µ * , and ρ are described in Section 1 and presented in column 5 of Table 3 .
We use the U.S. Social Security System 1995 proportional tax rate, .1052, on earnings; the System's earnings cap ($61,200/year for 1995); and its 1995 benefit formula. U.S. National Income and Product Account government spending (Federal and state and local) on goods and services suggests τ = .231. Based on the slow rate of technological progress after 1970, we set g = .01.
For our base case, we set r = .05. This is derived as follows. The ratio of ratio of corporate wages and salaries to corporate output is about .2985.
12 Multiplying this times GDP and subtracting total depreciation, we have return to capital net of depreciation. We further subtract the cost to households of financial services (e.g., brokerage fees and financial counseling, service charges of financial intermediaries, and handling expenses for life insurance and pension plans). 13 Then we divide by the sum of the current-cost nonresidential private capital stock, the residential private capital stock, the government fixed capital stock, and the stock of business inventories. The ratio is the average rate of return on capital; under marginal cost pricing and constant returns to scale, this is also the marginal return. The average return 1951-2001 is .055; the 1995 return is .051. Our net-of-tax return for households is r · (1 − τ ). Other calculations are, of course, possible. If we exclude residential housing services from GDP, exclude depreciation on residential housing from total depreciation, and omit the stock of residential housing from our denominator above, the average (gross of tax) rate of return is .081, and the 1995 value is .076. Conversely, Laitner and Stolyarov [2003] argue that intangible capital may be 50 percent as large as the nonresidential capital stock, and with such a correction the average rate of return (reinstating residential capital) falls to .050 and the 1995 rate to .046.
There is no need to set w -homotheticity makes the numerators of (19) and (23) linear in w just as the denominator is, so the wage cancels out of the ratio in each case. Table 4 summarizes our base-case parameter choices. Simulations. Table 5 presents three sets of simulations. The first, see row 1, generates aggregative ratios A/(w ·E) for our specification with uncertainty over earnings in the second half of life. A household resolves the uncertainty at age 45 -see (20)- (22) . The secondrow specification eliminates uncertainty, fixing, past age 45, mean earnings conditional on initial earnings. Economic theory shows that row 2 ratios will be smaller than row 1. The third row of Table 5 follows all possible first and second period of life outcomes, with a household knowing its µ and µ * as it begins work -see (19) . We take row 1 minus row 3 as our measure of precautionary wealth accumulation. (Note that there is no theoretical reason that this measure must always be positive.) Table 5 presents results for values of γ between 0 and -4. As we would expect, a lower γ, implying more curvature in the utility function u(.), leads to higher precautionary wealth accumulation. For γ = 0, our measure of precautionary wealth, the difference between row 1 and row 3, is slightly negative. For γ = −1, precautionary saving increases national wealth by 5.3%; for γ = −1.5, the increase is 8.3%; for γ = −2, it is 11.1%; and, for γ = −4, the increase is 20.5%. Since the empirical ratio A/(w · E) is about 4.61, for γ = −1 life-cycle saving including precautionary wealth accumulation explains about 73% of U.S. wealth. With γ = −2, the explained fraction rises to 77%; with γ = −4, it is 84%. For comparison, Modigliani [1986] argues that the life-cycle model can account for roughly 80% of U.S. net worth.
The last row of Table 5 suggests a problem with very low values of γ: for γ less than -1, the corresponding value of the subjective discount rate δ is negative -yet we explained above that values δ ∈ [0, .02], reflecting some impatience on the part of households, seem the most plausible. One possibility is that the empirical analysis yielding our base-case calibration of consumption growth did not include households' uncertainty about their earnings -see, for example, Caballero [1990] .
A second possibility is that slight changes in our calibrations would help. Mathematically, ifĉ t is the percentage growth rate of a household's consumption per capita over ages in which the household's composition is not changing and in which new information about future earnings is not becoming available, we have
Our base case setsĉ t = .02. For a given γ, however, we can see that δ can be larger if r t is higher or ifĉ t is lower. The lowest estimate ofĉ t in Laitner [2003] is .0176. Table 6 considers .015 -a rate of growth at which a household's consumption per capita would rise by a factor of about 1.8 over 40 years. If we exclude residential capital (and its service flow and depreciation), we argued above that we might set r t = .076. Table 6 considers this as well. For eitherĉ t = .015 or r t = .076, Table 6 shows that a non-negative δ emerges for γ as low as -1.5. Precautionary saving then augments life-cycle wealth accumulation by 6-7%. In both cases, the percent of U.S. net worth accounted for is smaller, however, than when γ = −1 in Table 5 .
A third possibility is that our utility function -although very standard in the economics literature -is too restrictive. 15 We proceed assuming that values of γ much below -1 yield implausible implications for δ.
Returning to Table 5 , the large difference between rows 2 and 3 is a surprise. Consider the column with γ = −1. In the certainty-equivalent case, each household finishes life with average earnings conditional on its starting earnings. Total life-cycle saving is only 58% of empirical national net worth. In row 3, initial earnings are the same, but though there is a distribution of second-stage-of-life earnings, each household knows its second-stage realization as it begins adulthood. 16 A household expecting a low second-period realization will save extra in youth; a household expecting a high second-period realization will save less. The reactions will be asymmetric, however: the liquidity constraint a ts ≥ 0 puts a restriction on the reduction in saving for a household anticipating high earnings late in life, but there is no corresponding limitation for the increase in saving for a household that is pessimistic about its future earnings. Row 3 generates 69-70% of empirical net worth. Making second-period-of-life earnings uncertain until age 45 -see row 1 -only increases life-cycle net worth to 73% of the empirical total. Although a full recognition of the uninsurable earning uncertainty that households face is appealing from the point of view of realism, in practice the step from row 2 to row 3 is much larger than the step from row 3 to row 1. Sensitivity Analysis. Table 7 considers alternative child and retirement weights. In all cases the subjective discount rate remains as in Table 5 .
Suppose γ = −1. With ξ C = .50, a value consistent with Mariger [1987] and others, the role of precautionary saving virtually disappears (uncertainty actually lowers aggregative life-cycle net worth slightly). As we would expect, higher consumption for children substantially lowers the fraction of empirical net worth that the model can explain -from 73 percent in Table 5 to 60 percent in Table 7 .
With ξ C = .25 as in Table 5 , changes in the fall in consumption at retirement have little effect on the role of precautionary saving -as in Table 5 , precautionary wealth accumulation is about 5 percent of the life-cycle total. As one would expect, if the weight on retirement consumption is higher, young households save more and aggregative life-cycle net worth is higher. In Table 5 , life-cycle saving explains 75 percent of 1995 empirical net worth when γ = −1; in Table 7 it explains 78 percent with ξ R = .90, but only 69 percent with ξ R = .80. Table 8 summarizes our last experiment. It employs h µ , h µ * , and ρ from column 4 (i.e., college graduates) in Table 3 . The second-period-of-life standard deviation is noticeably higher, and the correlation ρ lower, than for other education categories. The college educated group makes up about one-quarter of the whole sample (by sampling weight).
Precautionary saving increases life-cycle accumulation by 7.4% in column 2, Table 8 -up from 5.3% in the same column of Table 5 . Perhaps more surprising, A c /(w·E) for the certainty case is 12% larger than Table 5 . Again, asymmetric responses to increases and decreases of second-period earnings seem quantitatively more important to total wealth accumulation than uncertainty about second-period-of-life earnings. 16 In row 1, at age 22 a household knows its µ and the conditional distribution for its µ * ; the household learns its actual µ * at age 45. In row 2, at age 22 a household learns µ and µ * , with the latter equaling its conditional mean from row 1. In row 3, at age 22 a household learns both µ and µ * ; µ * can take any of the values possible in row 1.
Conclusion
This paper studies the quantitative importance of precautionary wealth accumulation relative to life-cycle saving for retirement. The first section examines panel data on earnings from the PSID. We find that the cross-sectional variance of earnings within a cohort rises with age. Using a bivariate normal model of random effects, we find that second-period-of-life earnings are strongly positively correlated with initial earnings but indeed have a higher variance. The paper's next section studies the consequences for lifecycle saving. It assumes that households know their youthful earning power as they enter the labor market but that they know only the conditional distribution of their secondperiod-of-life earnings. Only in midlife do they learn their actual second-period earning ability.
For our most plausible calibrations, precautionary saving only adds 5-6% to aggregative life-cycle wealth accumulation. Nevertheless, our earnings model emerges as quite important: even if second-period-of-life earning changes are fully predictable from youth, so that precautionary saving (i.e., responsiveness to uncertainty) plays no role, the variety of earning profiles that our bivariate normal model generates itself stimulates enough extra wealth accumulation to merit careful consideration. In the presence of liquidity constraints, predictions of rising earnings decrease youthful saving less than anticipations of falling earnings raise it. In the end, heterogeneity of earning profiles, even without uncertainty, tends to increase aggregative life-cycle wealth accumulation. 
